“Fabian - With respect, maybe it's time to' shake the formal foundations' of data management, especially given the rising costs and increasing segregation of silos.”
“John, if I were to say what I really think, I would be accused of insulting, so I won't. You don't need to respect me, but you better respect formal foundations. Since they are what gives SOUNDNESS to data management practice, what you are really saying is that you don't care about soundness -- do you really intend to take this position? I would not be surprised, because the industry has long "shook" the formal foundations and lack of soundness is precisely what characterizes it. But because there is no longer proper education, practitioners are totally unaware of the relationship between formal foundations and soundness, everything is ad-hoc and arbitrary, yet they fail to recognize the consequences.”[1]
--LinkedIn.com
Thus an exchange with John Gorman on LinkedIn, in which he posed several questions (that I answered in the last week's post[2]), the subject being the importance of not confusing levels of representation, and, more specifically, avoiding conceptual-logical conflation (CLC)[3].
Somebody posted a link to my answers on Linkedin and in a comment on it John linked to a Richard Feynman YouTube lecture on "the general differences between the interests and customs of the mathematicians and the physicists". To which I responded that my very point is that, just like physics is not the mathematics used to describe it (a central issue in quantum mechanics), conceptual modeling is not data modeling, the latter is the representation of the former in the database -- they are distinct[2]. This brought to mind some older columns I published on the All Analytics website that no longer exists, so this series is a revision thereof.
“Ok, now that we have those two (Parts 3 and 4 of your series) 'on the table' so to speak, perhaps you would address these questions...
1. Would it be safe to say that facts expressed in a Conceptual model should be verifiable in reality?
2. Are the following facts logically equivalent or are they different:
a) The car with license number 62-JZK-6 has the color aquamarine blue
b) De auto met kenteken 62-JZK-6 heeft de kleur aquamarijnblauw
3. If a previously true fact is found in reality to be verifiably false, would that mean the Conceptual model is wrong or the Logical model, or reality?”
“I'm going to add another:
4. How does RDM handle temporal changes to the 'truth' of statement 2a) when:
a) The owner of the car paints it black.
b) The owner of the license plate legally transfers it to a truck.
c) The owner of the car replaces every single part except the chassis.”
John O'Gorman asked me these questions in a LinkedIn exchange[1] in response to my comments in another exchange on modeling[2], where I alerted to the confusion of levels of representation common in the industry, particularly conceptual-logical conflation(CLC)[3]: calling conceptual modeling data modeling both reflects and induces it.
Online exchanges are not a proper vehicle for learning, particularly foundation knowledge. Which is why I publish free blog posts, and papers and books, to which to refer interested serious data professionals. It just so happened that my just posted four-part series covers the subject at hand[4], so I referred to it, as well as other writings (the answers are already there if one cares to read them). I will not discuss the whole exchanges -- read them and judge for yourself -- but I promised to answer the questions here, where I can do them justice.
John raises primarily conceptual, not data model issues -- the latter are subservient to decisions in the former -- but then asks "how does RDM handle..." From experience, I recognize implicit doubts that the RDM can. As far as we know there is no formal data model[5] that is a superior alternative to the RDM with respect to "handling" conceptual issues (in fact, there is no other formal data model -- i.e., that satisfies Codd's definition -- period).
Since most of the issues involved are covered by McGoveran's work in progress[6] (in which my multi-part series is rooted), to ensure consistency with it I passed the questions by him. As he too pointed out, "Answers that work in all situations require highly complicated discussions and lots of time, and trying to teach someone without proper experience and educational background would be very cumbersome, or an oversimplication via online exchanges."
Here's what's possible within the constraints of a blog post -- the serious reader is referred to our writings.
Revised 6/26/19.
In
Part 1 and Part 2 we
explained that when the RDM (1969-70) and the E/RM (1976) were
introduced, there was no distinction between a conceptual and a logical
level -- the conceptual-logical-physical distinction of levels of
representation emerged in mid 80s. Only in 1980 did Codd specify three
components of a formal data model -- structure, integrity, manipulation.
While the RDM satisfies the specification, the E/RM does not: it is a
conceptual modeling approach, weaknesses of which have been elaborated
elsewhere[1]. In Part 3 we presented a common example of conceptual-logical conflation (CLC),
and corresponding confusion of types of model (conceptual, logical,
physical, and data).
As promised, here we outline a new
conceptual modeling approach derived by David McGoveran from his work
formalizing Codd's RDM. It makes an ontological commitment different
from that by conventional modeling, which requires revision and
extension of the RDM -- an objective of David's effort.
